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ASTROTURF CAMPAIGNS: TRANSPARENCY IN TELECOM
MERGER REVIEW
Victoria Peng*
“Where enough money calls the tune, the general public will
not be heard . . . [and] a cynical public can lose interest in
political participation altogether.”
- McCutcheon v. FEC (Breyer, J., dissenting)
Large telecommunications companies looking to merge spend millions of dollars in
their lobbying efforts to clear regulatory hurdles and obtain approval for their pro-
posed mergers. Corporations such as AT&T, Comcast, and Time Warner use
public participation processes as vehicles to influence regulatory decision-making.
In the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) merger review context, the no-
tice-and-comment process and public hearings have become fertile breeding grounds
for hidden corporate influence. Corporations spend millions on corporate social
responsibility programs and call upon nonprofit organizations that receive their
largesse to represent their corporate interests as grassroots interests when the FCC
seeks public comment. This “astroturfing” undermines what Congress intended to
be a “well-reasoned agency deliberation process” and makes the FCC’s notice-and-
comment process less democratically legitimate. This Note argues that the FCC
should adopt a financial conflicts of interest disclosure rule for all comments it
receives, not just comments that include scientific or technological data. Adminis-
trative agencies’ anxiety about ensuring the integrity of science-based preferences
also applies to values-based preferences because the FCC  considers the effects on the
public interest in making policy decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of administrative agencies under the New Deal
may not have destroyed the constitutional balance of state and fed-
eral power, but it has no doubt placed a thumb on the federal side
of the scale.1  Given this dramatic enlargement of federal power,
Congress placed procedural checks on agencies to promote trans-
parency, keep the public informed so that those to be affected by
administrative regulations can express their views before the regula-
tions take effect, and hold government officials accountable.2  The
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) requires agencies to
give public notice of an impending action related to their organiza-
tion, procedures and rules,3 and then provide a time period for
interested persons of the public to weigh in “through submission of
written data, views, or arguments” in rulemaking proceedings.4
This process is called “notice and comment rulemaking.”
1. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and
Politics: The Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 Yale L.J. 1920 (2014).
2. See BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: SUMMARY AND ANAL-
YSIS 1, 1, 3–4 (1946).
3. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURE ACT § I-A (1947), http://archive.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/1947cover.html.
4. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
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Given an increasingly autonomous and decreasingly transparent
administrative state, those involved in administrative law and proce-
dure continue to grapple with how agencies should handle the
massive volume of comments they receive in the technological era.
Current scholarly discussion focuses on whether agencies making
policy decisions should pay equal attention to comments expressing
unsophisticated value-laden preferences (e.g. this is good, or this is
bad) as they do to comments based on specialized knowledge.5  At
the forefront of research in this area, Professor Cynthia Farina and
her colleagues at the Cornell eRulemaking Initiative slotted citi-
zens’ preferences about public policy outcomes into four
categories: spontaneous, group-framed, informed, and adaptive.6
Yet, another type of comment these categories do not capture has
become increasingly prevalent in the past decade: corporate-
funded preferences.  Individuals or entities (i.e. not-for-profit
groups or other public interest groups) that have either no prefer-
ence or different true preferences on an issue yield to the
preferences of a corporation because of an existing or expected
(oftentimes financial) benefit.  These preferences mislead agencies
reviewing public comments, as agency officials might have difficulty
distinguishing between true individual preferences and corporate-
funded preferences.  This Note argues that agencies, in particular
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), that receive mass
comments should flag and filter out corporate-funded comments to
carefully curate and consider comments in a useful, representative,
and informative way, and to avoid being misled.  There is scant dis-
cussion on the need for a financial conflicts of interest disclosure
rule in the agency rulemaking context, and what exists focuses on
comments presenting scientific analysis.7
Although it does not fully adopt notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing procedures in reviewing mergers, the FCC discretionarily gives
notice of large merger proposals it receives and takes public com-
ment when those transactions may generate significant public
reaction.  Recently, large telecommunications companies have
grown adept at mobilizing members of the public to submit com-
ments advocating the corporation’s position.  These efforts have
5. Nina A. Mendelson, Foreword: Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1343 (2011) (arguing that agencies should pay attention to value-laden
comments). Cf. Cynthia R. Farina, Mary Newhart & Josiah Heidt, Rulemaking vs. Democracy:
Judging and Nudging Public Participation That Counts, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 123, 123
(2012) (explaining that agencies and academics typically regard mass comments—consisting
largely of value-laden preferences—as “worse than useless”).
6. Farina, supra note 5, at 132–34.
7. See infra note 173.
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supplemented corporations’ robust lobbying to gain regulatory ap-
proval of proposed mergers.  There are feasible measures that the
FCC should implement to enhance the quality of the comments it
considers in a mass commenting society.  Part I of this Note pro-
vides an overview of the FCC’s authority to review
telecommunications mergers, its mandate to consider the public in-
terest, and its process of taking comments on major transactions
that might elicit significant public discussion.  Part II examines how
financial ties between corporations and nonprofit organizations can
affect agency decision-making.  Part III proposes a financial con-
flicts of interest disclosure rule to make public comment filings less
misleading and more useful to the FCC.  This proposed rule is con-
sistent with the Obama Administration’s strong stance in favor of
transparency, open government, and public engagement.
I. FCC REVIEW OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS MERGERS
A. The FCC’s Statutory Authority for Merger Review
Telecommunications companies looking to merge are subject to
dual review by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FCC.  Sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act authorizes the DOJ to block any
acquisition that may “substantially . . . lessen competition, or . . .
tend to create a monopoly.”8  Sections 7 and 11 of the Act authorize
the FCC to review mergers of “common carriers engaged in wire or
radio communication” under a standard that is identical to that of
the DOJ.9  But the FCC instead chooses to review mergers exclu-
sively under the Communications Act of 1934, broadening the
inquiry beyond that which the Clayton Act prescribes.10
The FCC also has more discretionary review authority under the
Communications Act than the DOJ does under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act.11  The Communications Act requires the FCC to ap-
prove any acquisition or construction of any new communications
line by a common carrier or any transfer of licenses to transmit signals
over the air.12  The FCC’s power under these licensing provisions is
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
9. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21(a) (2012).
10. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 214, 310 (2012); see also William J. Rinner, Comment, Optimizing
Dual Agency Review of Telecommunications Mergers, 118 YALE L.J. 1571, 1574 n.17 (2009); Donald
J. Russell & Sherri Lynn Wolson, Dual Antitrust Review of Telecommunications Mergers by the
Department of Justice and the Federal Communications Commission, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 143,
144–45 & n.6 (2002).
11. See generally Russell & Wolson, supra note 10.
12. 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d) (2012).
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extensive because practically every major telecommunications
merger requires the transfer of licenses.13  Although both the FCC
and the DOJ review the competitive effects of a merger, only the
FCC considers on a case-by-case basis whether the transaction as a
whole would serve the public interest.14  Thus, the FCC exercises an
important policymaking function that the DOJ does not.
B. The Public Interest Mandate
The Communications Act mandates the FCC to affirmatively de-
termine whether a merger promotes “the public interest,
convenience and necessity.”15  Congress gave the FCC this task be-
cause it requires expert judgment and considerable knowledge16 of
a technical, complex, and dynamic industry.17  This makes the
FCC’s merger review more flexible and forward-looking than is the
DOJ’s review based solely upon antitrust considerations.  The pub-
lic interest evaluation of a merger appears to require a narrower
focus than does analyzing its industry-wide effects, but in practice,
the standard “tends to be more amorphous and wide-ranging than
Section 7 [of the Clayton Act].”18
The public interest standard is nebulous in practice because the
FCC has been inconsistent in its interpretation of this mandate.
The FCC “inquires into whether the proposed [merger] might vio-
late any provisions of the Communications Act or ‘promise[s] to
yield affirmative public benefits.’”19  But the agency on occasion has
gone beyond considering whether a merger is “in” or “consistent
with” the public interest standard and has required mergers to “en-
hance competition.”20  What is settled is that consumer welfare is an
13. Russell & Wolson, supra note 10, at 148.
14. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2012); see also Issues Memorandum for March 1, 2000 Transac-
tions Team Public Forum on Streamlining FCC Review of Applications Relating to Mergers,
Fed. Commuc’ns Comm’n (2000), http://transition.fcc.gov/transaction/issuesmemo.html.
15. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (2012).
16. McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 87 (1944).
17. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1002–03
(2005).
18. Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger Review: Stacking the
Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 159, 201 n.142.
19. Rinner, supra note 10, at 1574 (quoting Ameritech Corp., 14 FCC Rcd. 14712,
14737–38 (1999) (emphasis added)).
20. See NYNEX Corp., 12 FCC Rcd. 19985, 19987 (1997) [hereinafter NYNEX/Bell Atlan-
tic] (stating that “[i]n order to find that a merger is in the public interest, we must, for
example, be convinced that it will enhance competition”).
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important consideration.  The FCC might approve a merger be-
cause its efficiency savings would lower rates for customers,21
thereby enhancing consumer welfare.  But the FCC cannot deny a
merger simply because it would allow one firm to take advantage of
efficiencies that its rivals cannot also exploit.22  The objective of
blocking the latter merger is to protect existing competition for less
competitive rival firms, not to promote competitive entry for con-
sumers.  The public interest standard is concerned with consumer
welfare, not competitor welfare.  Denying that merger in an already
concentrated market arguably harms consumer welfare.23  Thus,
the D.C. Circuit Court has held that the FCC is not authorized to
“equaliz[e] competition among competitors,” but does have the au-
thority to conduct economic analysis and consider competitive
effects of a merger as part of the public interest analysis, so long as
its primary objective is to analyze the benefit to the public.24
Courts have provided important insights on the limitations of the
FCC’s authority in this area—namely that the focus of the standard
is upon the interests of the public rather than the interest of competi-
tors who may seek to use the merger process to drive a competitor
out of the market.25  This still leaves the FCC with nebulous, wide-
ranging review authority.  The FCC’s public interest considerations
include “the effects of the proposed transaction on universal ser-
vice, national security, spectrum efficiency, technological
innovation, and the diversity of views and content.”26  It does not
consider politically charged topics like employee job concerns27 be-
cause the public interest analysis “is not a broad license to promote
the general public welfare.”28  Thus, the FCC’s public interest stan-
dard allows the Commission to regulate at least some broader issues
21. Id. at 20003 n.67.
22. See Thomas M. Koutsky & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Separating Politics from Policy in FCC
Merger Reviews: A Basic Legal Primer of the “Public Interest” Standard, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
329, 343 n.74 (2010) (citing Joseph Farrell, Creating Local Competition, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 201,
212 (1996)).
23. See id.
24. SBC Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 1484, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Hawaiian
Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
25. Koutsky & Spiwak, supra note 22, at 342.
26. See James R. Weiss & Martin L. Stern, Serving Two Masters: The Dual Jurisdiction of the
FCC and the Justice Department Over Telecommunications Transactions, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
195, 198 (1998); see also NYNEX/Bell Atlantic, supra note 20.
27. Koutsky & Spiwak, supra note 22, at 338 n.45.
28. See NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662, 669–70 (1976) (noting that the
scope of “public interest” inquiry to ensure “just and reasonable rates” does not reach em-
ployee job concerns).
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than would otherwise be available under the standard DOJ antitrust
analysis.29
C. The FCC Procedures for Merger Review
Parties to a proposed merger initiate FCC review by formally fil-
ing an application with the Commission and providing supporting
materials.30  The FCC then issues a Public Notice that it has re-
ceived an application for consent to transfer licenses—to in other
words, merge31—and makes the entire application record available
to the public.32  The FCC provides a schedule for public comment
on major transactions that present “novel or complex issues of law
or policy” or “propose[ ] a combination of companies that is likely
to have a significant impact on the public or involves [other public
interest] issues that are likely to elicit significant public com-
ment.”33  Any person may file a comment, which becomes part of
the public record.34  Since the Commission is approving a transac-
tion rather than promulgating a rule, it is exempt from the notice-
and-comment procedures of the APA for rulemaking.35  This means
that the APA does not require the FCC to consider all substantial
written comments for merger approval, as it would for a rulemak-
ing.36  But the need to differentiate synthetic grassroots comments
(“astroturf”) from actual grassroots comments is just as relevant in
the FCC’s merger review process as it is in its rulemaking process.
29. STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 683 (3d ed.
2012).
30. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, in TELECOM ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 89–90 (2nd ed.
2013) [hereinafter TELECOM ANTITRUST HANDBOOK].
31. Overview of the FCC’s Review of Significant Transactions, FED. COMMUC’NS COMM’N (Aug.
15, 2014), http://www.fcc.gov/guides/review-of-significant-transactions.
32. Russell & Wolson, supra note 10, at 148–49.
33. FCC’s Review of Significant Transactions, supra note 31.
34. See id.; see also Frequently Asked Questions About Transactions, FED. COMMUC’NS COMM’N
(Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.fcc.gov/guides/mergers-frequently-asked-questions.
35. BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, supra note 2, at 6. (“‘Rule’ means the whole or any part of
an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to im-
plement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or to describe the organization, procedure, or
practice requirements of any agency . . . ‘Order’ means the whole or any part of the final
disposition (whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form) of any agency
in any matter other than rule making but including licensing. ‘Adjudication’ means agency
process for the formulation of an order.”).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012); Northside Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Thomas, 849 F.2d 1516,
1520 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (articulating the concept of § 533 of the APA as imposing a procedural
dialogue between administrative agencies and the public in which an interested party must
clearly state its position and the agency must respond to significant comments received) (em-
phasis added).
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If the FCC commissioners choose to provide notice and take com-
ment, as they do for major transactions, then they should still want
to collect a public record of comments that conveys the public’s
actual views and that does not contain misleading statements or
information.
The applicants bear the burden of proving on the public record
that their proposed merger is in the public interest or that the ben-
efits more than offset any likely anticompetitive effect.37  This
fundamentally departs from the DOJ merger review process; when
the DOJ seeks to block a transaction it must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the proposed merger has anticompetitive
effects.38  The applicants carry a higher burden of proof in seeking
FCC approval than in obtaining DOJ approval because of the Com-
mission’s public interest mandate.39  The Commission reviews the
public record, which includes the parties’ documentation and pub-
lic comments, and determines whether the merger would be in the
public interest.40  The FCC “may base its decision on evidence that
would not be admissible in court and can reject a transaction if the
merging parties fail to prove that their deal serves the public
interest.”41
The FCC has no statutory deadline for completing its review, but
is subject to a 180-day self-imposed deadline.42 The Commission,
however, rarely adheres to this deadline; telecommunications merg-
ers take between nine and twelve months to conclude, whereas the
average merger takes only two to four months.43  The FCC’s lengthy
37. See Jon Sallet, FCC Transaction Review: Competition and the Public Interest, OFFICIAL FCC
BLOG (Aug. 13, 2014, 6:49 PM), http://www.fcc.gov/blog/fcc-transaction-review-competition
-and-public-interest#fn4; see also Christopher J. Wright, General Counsel, Fed. Commuc’ns
Comm’n, Comments Introducing the Transactions Team Presentation on Timely Considera-
tion of Applications Accompanying Mergers (Mar. 1, 2000), https://transition.fcc.gov/
Speeches/misc/statements/wright030100.html.
38. See, e.g., XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc., 23 FCC Rcd. 12348, 12365–66 (2008),
http://www.siriusxm.com/wo/i/entity/Merger%20Order%208-5-08.pdf.
39. The applicant must show that “the transfer is likely to provide affirmative public
benefits. That inquiry is plainly required under the statute, since the applicable statutory
provisions direct the Commission to determine whether a transfer would serve the public
interest.” Wright, supra note 37.
40. The Commission’s “public interest authority enables us to rely upon our extensive
regulatory and enforcement experience to impose and enforce conditions to ensure that a
transaction will yield overall public interest benefits.” XM Satellite Radio, 23 FCC Rcd. at
12366.
41. Weiss & Stern, supra note 26, at 197.
42. See TELECOM ANTITRUST HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 89; see also FED. COMMUC’NS
COMM’N, INFORMAL TIMELINE FOR CONSIDERATION OF APPLICATIONS FOR TRANSFERS OR ASSIGN-
MENTS OF LICENSES OR AUTHORIZATIONS RELATING TO COMPLEX MERGERS, http://www.fcc.gov/
transaction/timeline.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2015).
43. Rachel E. Barkow & Peter W. Huber, A Tale of Two Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of
FCC and DOJ Review of Telecommunications Mergers, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 29, 31–32 (2000).
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review of large telecommunications mergers could undermine the
public interest merits of the transaction, as Professor Susan Craw-
ford describes:
It’s a game: the companies that plan to merge know that if
they can get the regulators to spend enough time considering
the deal, it will probably go through.  There may be a brief
struggle with underfunded public-interest groups, but if no
other large companies oppose the deal, the feds’ investment of
time in working with the merging parties, coupled with their
interest in moving on to other items on their agenda, gener-
ally overcomes any private concerns about consolidation of
market power.44
The general purpose of public comments has been to inform
agencies of constituents’ views45 and to ensure that proposals are
based on “sound factual and legal premises. . . .”46  The public com-
ment process has also evolved into a form of democratic
policymaking.47  When Congress delegated significant portions of
its lawmaking responsibilities to federal administrative agencies, it
reformed administrative procedure to require agencies to make
public “an increased measure of information concerning their or-
ganization, functions, and procedures,” and afford an opportunity
for public participation in the rulemaking process.48  Congress was
responding to President Roosevelt’s remarks that administrative
agencies “who perform administrative work in addition to judicial
work, threaten[ ] to develop a ‘fourth branch’ of the Government
for which there is no sanction in the Constitution.”49  By requiring
agencies to give notice and take public comments on each pro-
posed rule, Congress meant to “force unelected bureaucrats to
consider the public interest in the formulation of federal regula-
tions.”50  That mandate also increased agency accountability and
44. SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRY AND MONOPOLY POWER
IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 208 (2013).
45. See William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsive-
ness In Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66, 66
(2004) (finding that public comments can serve as fire alarms that help politicians ensure
that bureaucracy is responsive to their constituents).
46. See id. at 68.
47. See id. at 66, 68.
48. BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, supra note 2, at 3 (quoting Attorney General Tom C.
Clark’s statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding reforms in administrative law
and procedure).
49. Id. at 1.
50. Marissa M. Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose
Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 246 (Apr. 2008).
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democratic legitimacy,51 at least compared to Congress’s own legis-
lative drafting processes.  Given this legally mandated avenue for
public participation, public interest groups could be highly influen-
tial when a company seeks regulatory action.  In practice, however,
the regulated entities themselves are the greatest and most influen-
tial participants in the process.52
D. Recent Trends in Public Comment Submissions to the FCC
In the FCC merger review context, both the notice-and-comment
process and public hearings have become fertile breeding grounds
for direct corporate participation as well as hidden corporate influ-
ence.  As telecommunications mergers have become more
common, a smattering of writings has chronicled corporate use of
these public participation processes as vehicles to influence regula-
tory decision-making.53  In 2007, the year Steve Jobs announced the
first iPhone, some Americans were still resentful about telecommu-
nications companies’ mid-1990’s deals with state utility commissions
“to deploy new technologies in exchange for ‘incentives,’ which
were new charges and new ways of charging customers,” but ulti-
mately failed to provide enhanced service to customers.54  The
companies took large tax write-offs after claiming they would re-
place aging copper wires that ran through homes, schools and
offices for phone service with fiber optic cables in the future.  But
around 1998, the companies started to roll out a type of digital sub-
scriber line (DSL) technology, inferior to fiber optic cables, over
the copper wires.55  As a result, major telephone companies prof-
ited hugely from 1994 to 2004, while American consumers received
51. Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical
Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 100 (2011).
52. Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE
L.J. 1321, 1336–37 (2010) (stating that stakeholders with relatively greater resources, such as
regulated entities, often dominate the outcomes of regulation through financial induce-
ments or their capacity to digest technical and complicated information); see generally Susan
W. Yackee, Reconsidering Agency Capture During Regulatory Policymaking, in PREVENTING REGULA-
TORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 292 (Daniel Carpenter et
al. eds., 2013) (concluding that regulated entities, or business interests, have greater rates of
participation and hold more influence, but not consistently across rules or agencies).
53. See infra notes 76, 112–13, 186. In recent years, Cecilia Kang at the Washington Post,
Eliza Krigman and Tony Romm at Politico, and Eric Lipton at the New York Times have fol-
lowed and reported on this topic.
54. Robert X. Cringely, The $200 Billion Rip-Off: Our Broadband Future Was Stolen, PBS: I,
CRINGELY (Aug. 10, 2007), http://www.pbs.org/cringely/pulpit/2007/pulpit_20070810_
002683.html. See generally Bruce A. Kushnick, The Book of Broken Promises: $400 Billion
Broadband Scandal and Free the Net (2015).
55. Id.
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inferior service from U.S. broadband Internet Service Providers
(ISPs)56 at higher prices57 as compared to citizens in other devel-
oped countries.  This “rent-seeking”58 is socially wasteful;59 yet,
Congress and the FCC have not sought to police the issue, resulting
in a less transparent rulemaking process.
Academics cite transparency in agency decision-making as a criti-
cal factor to build legitimacy, enhance quality, and increase
accountability.60 In January 2009, President Obama signed the
Memorandum on Transparency and Government, which declared
that government should be transparent, participatory, and collabo-
rative.61  Specifically, President Obama asked the heads of executive
departments and agencies to work together to “ensure the public
56. Id.
57. An October 2014 report by the New America Foundation’s Open Technology Insti-
tute comparing broadband offerings in twenty-four countries across the world showed that
consumers in Europe and Asia pay as little as around $30 a month for a 1000 Mbps Internet
download speed.  By contrast, Verizon’s top tier is a 500 Mbps connection that is available to
some residents of New York City, Washington D.C., and Los Angeles for about $300 a month.
Danielle Kehl et al., THE COST OF CONNECTIVITY 2014, OPEN TECH. INST. 11–12 (2014),
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/229-the-cost-of-connectivity-2014/
OTI_The_Cost_of_Connectivity_2014.pdf. The OECD’s latest available data on broadband
speed and price in thirty-four member countries places the U.S. in the middle towards the
bottom of the pack. See id. at 2–3.
58. The term “rent seeking” describes an attempt to secure via government regulation
economic “rents” not otherwise available from the market. In a typical example, a business
solicits regulatory barriers on market entry, such as a licensing requirement, and if successful,
obtains the benefits of higher price levels resulting from reduced competition. In the
telecom context, a corporation seeks rent when it attempts to increase its market share by
spending money on lobbying to impose regulations on competitors. See generally Anne O.
Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974) (coining
the phrase “rent seeking”); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft, 5
W. ECON. J. 3, 228 (1967) (explaining socially wasteful effects of rent seeking).
59. See generally Tullock, supra note 58.
60. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin & Evan Mendelson, Transparency and
Public Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process: Recommendations for the New Administration,
77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924, 925 (2009) (summarizing results of discussions from a nonparti-
san Task Force on Transparency and Public Participation); Farina, supra note 5, at 135
(“[D]ecades of judicial elaboration have constructed rulemaking as a process in which out-
come legitimacy turns on a formally transparent process of reasoned deliberation.”); Michael
Halpern, Comments on Rulemaking vs. Democracy: Judging and Nudging Public Participation That
Counts, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10681, 10682 (2014) (“The need to foster legitimacy cannot be
understated: an opaque process fosters a lack of faith in government, which undermines a
rule’s effectiveness.”); Mendelson, supra note 5, at 1379 (arguing that disclosure and trans-
parency are the best incentives for agencies to be democratically responsive to executive
supervision and public comment). See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 71–73 (1992).
61. Exec. Office of the President, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Depart-
ments and Agencies on Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 26,
2009). The memorandum was released on January 21, 2009 [hereinafter Memo for Heads of
Executive Dep’ts)].
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trust and establish a system of transparency, public participation,
and collaboration.”62
Yet in 2014, the year the iPhone 6 was released, Americans still
complained that the FCC’s decision-making lacked transparency in
process and legitimacy in outcome.  And today, many commenters
will not receive agency responses to their comments in a mass com-
menting society.  These people will not know whether the FCC has
considered their comments, and as a result, may have less confi-
dence in the Commission’s ultimate policy outcome.
These consumer sentiments have reemerged in the wake of the
FCC’s net neutrality rulemaking.  At the core of the net neutrality
debate was the issue of whether ISPs, which are gatekeepers to the
Internet, equipped with the power to slow down some content or
speed up others and potentially charge for prioritization, should be
able to control access to the Internet in this way.63 In one striking
moment, weekly satirical news show host John Oliver delivered a
thirteen-minute rant lambasting the FCC’s approach to net neutral-
ity in June 2014.64  Oliver’s call for viewers to comment on the
FCC’s site may have crashed the agency’s servers.65
The FCC received approximately 3.7 million comments on net
neutrality.66  The Commission explained that technological and
human resources would summarize and condense the comments it
received.67  When asked at the time whether he thought the net
neutrality comments would matter to the FCC, George Washington
University Law School professor Richard Pierce replied, “[t]he vast
majority of the comments are utterly worthless.”68  He pointed to
the fact that rulemaking and policymaking are systematically biased
towards deep-pocketed industries whose detail, data, and analysis-
62. Id.
63. Statement on Internet Neutrality, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 841 (Nov. 10, 2014).
64. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Net Neutrality (HBO television broadcast June 1,
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FPbOEoRrHyU; see Doug Aamoth, John Oliver’s
Net Neutrality Rant Crashes FCC Servers, TIME (June 3, 2014), http://time.com/2817567/john-
oliver-net-neutrality-fcc/; Soraya Nadia McDonald, John Oliver’s Net Neutrality Rant May Have
Caused FCC Site Crash, WASH. POST. (June 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
morning-mix/wp/2014/06/04/john-olivers-net-neutrality-rant-may-have-caused-fcc-site-
crash/.
65. See Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, supra note 64.
66. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19737, 19746 (April
13, 2015), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-04-13/pdf/2015-07841.pdf; see also
@GigiBSohnFCC, TWITTER (Sept. 16, 2014, 2:24 PM), https://twitter.com/GigiBSohnFCC/
status/511989049725571072 (revealing the number of comments the FCC received as the
extended public comment period ended).
67. Elise Hu, 1 Million Net Neutrality Comments Filed, But Will They Matter? NATIONAL PUB-
LIC RADIO (July 21, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/07/21/33
2678802/one-million-net-neutrality-comments-filed-but-will-they-matter.
68. Id.
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backed comments can change minds.69 In the FCC’s merger review
context, however, the Commission’s public interest mandate should
bar it from discounting such a large volume of comments for lack
of technical savvy.
In another pivotal moment, FCC Commissioner Mignon Clyburn
engaged in an ill-fated “Ask Me Anything” (AMA) session on the
social news site Reddit in November 2014.70  The session brought
out public dissatisfaction with the comment process and disappoint-
ment with the FCC’s regulation of the telecommunications
industry, or lack thereof.71  Whatever intentions the FCC Commis-
sioner had in agreeing to participate in the crowd-sourced
interview, it resulted in an online press conference gone wrong.72
The session quickly turned into a de facto public comment forum,
the theme of which was that the agency and its officials are discon-
nected from the public.  Clyburn spent most of her time parrying
the community members’ thrusts that their comments were not be-
ing read and that their voices, even en masse, were not being
heard.73
One might argue that Last Week Tonight with John Oliver and Red-
dit attract certain demographics that may not represent the views of
the American public as a whole.  It is also possible to contend that
both the FCC site crash and the Clyburn AMA were fodder for sen-
sationalism while a high profile, large stakes merger between
Comcast and Time Warner Cable were under FCC review.  Taken
together, however, they signaled to those watching, including the
69. Id. (referencing Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t ‘Screw Joe the Plummer’: The Sausage-Mak-
ing of Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53–103 (2013) (finding that in the comment process
for the Volcker rule, proponents of strict regulation of financial institutions dominated nu-
merically, but were still outweighed by technical comments from industry members affected
by the regulation in the eyes of agency decision makers)).
70. Mignon Clyburn (MClyburnFCC), I Am FCC Commissioner Mignon Clyburn. Ask Me
Anything!, REDDIT (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/2n0co6/
i_am_fcc_commissioner_mignon_clyburn_ask_me/.
71. Id.
72. See Kevin Collier, FCC Commissioner Mignon Clyburn’s Reddit AMA Did Not Go Well,
DAILY DOT (Nov. 23, 2014, 3:24 PM), http://www.dailydot.com/politics/reddit-ama-fcc-mi-
gnon-clyburn/; see also Dana Liebelson, This FCC Commissioner Did A Reddit Chat. It Did Not Go
Well., HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 22, 2014, 5:02 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/
11/22/mignon-clyburn-reddit-chat_n_6204572.html.
73. Commenters voiced skepticism about the public comment process and whether the
FCC listens to the public, to which Clyburn responded, “Public comments absolutely influ-
ence the FCC deliberations, including rule makings [sic].” This response was downvoted 121
times by Reddit users. See MClyburnFCC, Comment to Mignon Clyburn, supra note 69.  At
another point in the thread, Clyburn responded, “I disagree completely. Your voices are
being heard and your comments are being read,” which received 238 downvotes. See id.
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media, that the FCC’s failure to take the public seriously has ren-
dered the Commission’s legitimacy fragile—or at least not as robust
as the American people would like.
II. CORPORATIONS, INFLUENCE-BUYING, AND RULEMAKING
When a corporation gives money to a politician, this is lobbying,
which carries a negative connotation, but when it gives to a non-
profit organization, this is philanthropic corporate social
responsibility, which carries a positive connotation.  Even though
both types of spending are formally distinct, they are not necessarily
functionally different.  The impulse to curtail money flow from cor-
porations to politicians, particularly those engaged in oversight,
stems from the intuition that elected officials might violate their
duty to serve their constituents’ interests if they stand to benefit
financially from shaping laws to benefit the private parties that fund
their campaigns.  But efforts to curtail lobbying have been largely
unsuccessful,74 especially after the Supreme Court in Citizens United
v. FEC interpreted corporate independent expenditures—money
not donated directly to campaigns, but spent to persuade the voting
public through other means such as advertising—as a form of pro-
tected speech under the First Amendment.75 Moreover, legislators
do not have a comparable impulse to curtail corporate money flow
to nonprofit organizations even though they play a significant role
in the notice-and-comment process of agency rulemaking.  As third
parties in the rulemaking process, nonprofits appear independent
and objective, yet their potential financial conflicts of interest may
cast doubt on this characterization.  The notice-and-comment pro-
cess incentivizes corporations to cultivate relationships with
nonprofit groups as a key source of potential support for corporate
actions under regulatory review.76
Through the practice of “astroturfing,” corporations co-opt cer-
tain politicians and nonprofit groups to create the appearance of
grassroots support for the corporate position.77  In the same way
“AstroTurf” first mimicked natural grass on the Houston Astros’
baseball field, an “astroturf” campaign creates the impression of a
74. Money and Politics: Ask What Your Country Can Do for You, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 1,
2011), http://.economist.com//.
75. 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010) (holding that “[t]he Government may regulate corporate
political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that
speech altogether”).
76. Eliza Krigman, AT&T Gave Cash to Merger Backers, POLITICO (June 10, 2011), http://
.politico.com////.html.
77. Mendelson, supra note 5, at 1372.
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sincere grassroots movement when it actually advances a corporate
interest.  An early example of astroturfing involved tobacco giant
Philip Morris.  Beginning in 1958, the company had given millions
each year to the art industry in New York City, and with anti-smok-
ing legislation pending before the New York City Council in 1994,
Philip Morris executives telephoned art institutions that received
significant donations and asked them to voice support for the com-
pany with the City Council.78  Those efforts ultimately failed as New
York City banned indoor smoking in places like restaurants and
bars in 2002 and most outdoor smoking in 2011,79 but in the short
run Philip Morris influenced agency policymaking regarding the
link between smoking and cancer in favor of the tobacco industry.80
Similarly, in the late 1990s, administrative agencies recognized
that “medical researchers and other scientists [were] increasingly
vulnerable to temptation from patent royalties and other sources of
remuneration,”81 prompting a series of reforms including financial
conflicts of interest disclosure.  There is no reason to think that
money would not exert the same pressures on interest groups in the
telecom setting as it has in the medical research setting.  Astroturf-
ing thus creates a conflict of interest where a nonprofit
organization founded to serve a public interest might compromise
its mission when it stands to benefit financially from serving the
interests of certain private parties.
A. Astroturfing in the FCC Context Unfairly Skews the Landscape of the
Public Interest Towards the Industry
Although astroturfing can be misleading for many, if not all, fed-
eral agencies that take notice and comment, the FCC is particularly
susceptible because its statutory public interest mandate for review-
ing mergers implicitly requires the agency to consider public views.
Corporate interests amplified through astroturf comments create
the appearance of widespread support for a proposed merger as it
undergoes FCC scrutiny.  These comments most closely relate to
those Professor Farina identified as group-framed preferences,
which are generated when an interest group shares its position on a
78. Paul Goldberger, Philip Morris Calls In I.O.U.’s in the Arts, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 1994),
http://.nytimes.com/////-calls-in-iou-s-in-the-arts.html?pagewanted=All.
79. Jordana Ossad, New York City Outdoor Smoking Ban Begins, CNN (May 24, 2011),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/05/23/new.york.smoking.ban/.
80. See infra note 163.
81. William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health-
care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1807–08 n.399 (1999).
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specific issue with its members, who then form their preferences on
the issue based on the group’s position without considering other
sources of information.82 Unlike group-framed preferences, how-
ever, corporate-funded preferences are backed by something more
than shared values underlying an individual’s affiliation with the
group–they are motivated by a financial interest.  A corporate-
funded preference is created when an individual or entity—usually
a nonprofit organization that the corporation helps fund—that is
not a party to the merger deliberately aligns its values with the cor-
poration’s values on a specific issue.  The individual or entity is
motivated to do so by a desire for continued corporate sponsorship,
not because the individual or entity necessarily shares those values.
In the merger context, the corporate-funded preference does not
help smoke out the true public interest merits of a merger because
the individuals and entities simply amplify the corporation’s views
on the issue rather than developing and voicing their own indepen-
dent views.
Mass comments to the FCC in recent telecom mergers have re-
vealed astroturfing from both proponents and opponents of
proposed deals.  Public interest groups have prompted individuals
to file tens of thousands of one-page comments opposing these
deals and many of these letters have used language provided by the
groups.83  Likewise, large telecommunications companies have en-
couraged nonprofit organizations benefiting from their largesse to
file comments supporting the deal.  But, agencies should be more
concerned about astroturfing when the actor is a corporation than
when it is an interest group.  The most obvious difference is that
the nonprofit organizations that have been called upon for support
benefit financially from the companies they endorse, whereas indi-
vidual opponents submit comments of their own volition even if
interest group nudging was the trigger.
Thus, financial ties between corporations and nonprofits create a
troubling conflict of interest that is distinguishable from a harmless
conflict of interest that non-financial ties between public interest
group and individuals create.  Interest group-facilitated comments
might also use persuasive techniques to motivate citizens to partici-
pate in commenting, such as appeals to emotion, inflammatory
language and imagery, and selective use of facts and information.84
But these techniques place less pressure on the public to engage
82. Farina, supra note 5, at 133.
83. CRAWFORD, supra note 44, at 203.
84. Farina, supra note 5, at 135, 141–42.
WINTER 2016] Astroturf Campaigns 537
and are less persuasive than money because they are easier to re-
fuse.  Furthermore, it is commonplace for individuals, interest
groups, and industry groups to use rhetoric to engage the public to
file comments.85  Interest group-facilitated comments are also more
representative of actual public preferences than are corporate-facil-
itated comments from nonprofit organizations.  Individuals adopt
the interest group’s preference because they voluntarily accept it,
not because they have a financial incentive to adopt those views in
lieu of their actual preferences or no preference at all.  Interest
group-facilitated comments also make notice and comment more
representative on the whole because there is already a longstanding
imbalance in the rulemaking process.86  Currently, industry and
business groups have greater influence over agencies than public
interest groups do because they are better organized and have
more financial resources to expend on obtaining technical exper-
tise on the relevant issues.87  Thus, telecom astroturfing further
skews the rulemaking process in favor of the telecom industry, de-
creasing the democratic legitimacy of the commenting process.
B. Telecom Giants Buying Influence of Nonprofit Groups
Over the past decade, telecommunications corporations looking
to merge have employed creative, enormously expensive, and care-
fully orchestrated astroturf campaigns.88 Recent telecom deals
facing regulatory scrutiny demonstrate a clear pattern—those com-
panies distribute tens of millions of dollars to support left-wing,
diverse nonprofit groups with no obvious interest in these deals.
The Comcast-NBCUniversal merger and the attempted AT&T–T-
Mobile and Comcast-Time Warner Cable mergers have all involved
large influence-buying campaigns.89  In each case, nonprofit sup-
port was vocal and widespread and a substantial number of
nonprofits delivered public endorsements to the FCC.  These com-
ments, however, had little to do with the public interest merits of
the deal itself.90  The FCC, in complying with its statutory public
85. Nina A. Mendelson, Should Mass Comment Count?, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 173,
178 (2012).
86. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 132 (1998) (noting that a Senate Committee found that “regulated indus-
tries spend from ten to one hundred times as much as public interest groups do in
rulemaking and adjudication proceedings”).
87. See Wagner et al., supra note 51, at 102.
88. CRAWFORD, supra note 44, at 204–05.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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interest mandate, should place less weight on astroturf comments
relative to genuine grassroots comments.  Astroturf comments mag-
nify business interests and could drown out the voices of public
interest groups that are oftentimes fewer in number, but express
actual views that are useful to the agency.
1. The Comcast-NBCU Merger
Between 2001 and 2010, Comcast paid over $2.2 billion in chari-
table contributions,91 affording itself a creative way to influence
lawmakers.92  In 2009 alone, the same year it announced its plan to
acquire NBCUniversal in a thirty billion dollar deal, Comcast spent
more than $400 million in cash and in-kind contributions (mostly
televised public service announcements) to U.S. charities.93  The
company encouraged letters to the FCC from more than one thou-
sand nonprofits (in addition to government officials and
community activists), including “community centers, rehabilitation
centers, civil rights groups, community colleges, sports programs,
[and] senior citizen groups.”94  It was unclear how this motley crew
of nonprofit organizations was connected with the telecom deal be-
yond their common, major annual funder, Comcast.95  Instead, it
seems more reasonable to infer that Comcast had paved the way for
favorable public statements on its behalf.
The effectiveness of Comcast’s astroturf campaign was evident at
the sole FCC-convened field hearing on the merger in Chicago in
July 2010.  Of the five FCC commissioners, only one, Michael
Copps, attended the hearing; then-FCC Chairman Julius
Genachowski sent a video statement on the importance of the regu-
latory-review process.96  Observers characterized the hearing as a
farce.97  A majority of voices present during the two-hour public-
91. COMCAST CORP., 2010 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 24 (2010), http://
files.shareholder.com/downloads/CMCSA/0x0x479342/587c9f26-1f9c-4ced-9514-2c38aaa59
39e/FINAL_2010_CRR_6.27.11.pdf.
92. CRAWFORD, supra note 44, at 204.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 203.
95. Id. at 203–04 (providing an account of unrelated groups speaking for Comcast, in-
cluding a diagnostic treatment center, a drug prevention center, a dance program for at-risk
youth, and an organization that supports companion animals).
96. CRAWFORD, supra note 44, at 203; Margaret Smith, At Public Hearing, Citizens Speak Out
Against—and For—Comcast/NBC Merger, IN THESE TIMES (July 15, 2010), http://inthese-
times.com/ittlist/entry/7597/at_public_hearing_citizens_speak_out_againstand_forcomcast
nbc_merger.
97. See CRAWFORD, supra note 44, at 203–04, 207.
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comment period were nonprofit organizations that told the com-
mission how much they had benefited from Comcast’s corporate
generosity.98  The unusual backers of the deal included a Hispanic
civil rights group, a dance program for at-risk youth, a drug preven-
tion group,99 and an organization supporting “companion
animals.”100  An opponent of the deal addressed the elephant in the
room—she explained that Comcast’s effort as a corporate citizen
had nothing to do with the merger because none of those “social
service programs” would be jeopardized if the FCC blocked the
deal.101
The nonprofit organizations that supported the deal appeared to
be grassroots interests, but were actually a band of individuals sub-
mitting separate comments that represented a single view Comcast
created to further its corporate interest.  Taken together, one can
infer that Comcast tried to increase its influence with the FCC by
amplifying its views through recipients of its largesse. Because non-
profit organizations generally operate to add value to the social
group they serve, the FCC would likely find their views on public
interest issues to be credible and associate their views with those of
other similarly situated members of the greater population.  If the
FCC created a pie chart of the public preferences it has received
through filed public comments, the chart would already be dis-
torted by regulated entities taking a disproportionately large slice
simply because they participate more in commenting than public
interest groups do.102  Comcast’s astroturfing would cause its prefer-
ences to occupy a larger slice of the pie than that to which it should
be entitled, thus worsening the preexisting distortion.
2. The AT&T/T-Mobile Merger
Shortly after the FCC approved the Comcast-NBCU deal in 2011,
AT&T applied the same influence-buying campaign tactics in its at-
tempted merger with T-Mobile.  When the thirty-nine billion dollar
AT&T/T-Mobile deal was under FCC review, large nonprofits such
as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), the Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation
98. See id. at 203; see also Smith, supra note 96.
99. John Eggerton, Comcast Gets Better of Early Open Mike, BROADCASTING & CABLE (July 13,
2010), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/blog/bc-dc/comcast-gets-better-early-open-mike/
68719.
100. CRAWFORD, supra note 44, at 204.
101. See Smith, supra note 96.
102. See West, supra note 45, at 68.
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(GLAAD), and the National Education Association (NEA), the na-
tion’s largest teachers union, wrote individually to urge the FCC to
approve the deal.103  Purely local charities—some so small they had
a single staff member—such as a homeless shelter and clinic in
Louisiana, a Habitat for Humanity chapter in South Carolina, and
an employment agency for special-needs adults in Michigan, also
submitted endorsement letters to the FCC.104  Not included in these
letters, however, was that each backer had received money from
AT&T, and for some, just five months prior to their time of
writing.105
AT&T denied any quid pro quo arrangement, but its corporate
giving arm, the AT&T Foundation, had spent sixty-two million dol-
lars in 2009 in nonprofit contributions,106 and $148 million in 2010
through its corporate foundation and employee-giving programs,107
raising suspicions about whether the company was cashing in on its
corporate donor status to advance its corporate interests.  The char-
ities publicly stated that the money they received from AT&T did
not influence their decision to lobby the FCC,108 but their behavior
indicated otherwise.  GLAAD’s president and six board members
resigned when its merger endorsement made headlines and re-
vealed that the organization had received AT&T funds.109 The views
GLAAD conveyed to the FCC in support of the merger evoked up-
roar within the LGBT activist world, revealing that GLAAD’s
comment was misleading because it did not accurately represent
the views of its membership but was instead influenced by its corpo-
rate backers.110
Through support from left-wing groups—labor unions, minori-
ties, and environmentalists—AT&T increased its political clout by
103. Krigman, supra note 76.
104. Jason McLure, Charities Supporting AT&T’s Buyout of T-Mobile have Financial Incentive,
The Center for Public Integrity (May 19, 2014, 12:19 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/
2011/10/17/7118/charities-supporting-att-s-buyout-t-mobile-have-financial-incentive.
105. Krigman, supra note 76 (noting that the NAACP, one of the first groups to an-
nounce public support of the merger, had received a one million dollar contribution from
AT&T in 2009 in addition to six figure funds from the company since 2006; GLAAD received
fifty thousand dollars; the NEA received seventy-five thousand dollars; and the Columbia
Urban League received twenty-five thousand dollars); McLure, supra note 104 (The Shreve-
port-Bossier Rescue Mission received fifty thousand dollars from AT&T five months before
writing to FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski).
106. Krigman, supra note 76.
107. McLure, supra note 104.
108. Id.
109. Matthew Lasar, Astroturf Hurts: Leadership Resigns After GLAAD supports T-Mobile Sale,
ARS TECHNICA (July 5, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/07/glaadatt-melt
down-new-rules-for-teclo-backed-non-profits/.
110. See McLure, supra note 104.
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pressuring the FCC’s Democratic party members who might have
otherwise opposed wireless industry consolidation that could leave
Americans with fewer provider choices and higher prices for poorer
service.111
The AT&T Foundation’s sophistication in its charitable giving is
also a product of the company’s organization. AT&T placed its
chief lobbyist and senior executive vice president, James Cicconi, in
the chairman position of the charitable arm.112 AT&T executives sit
on the boards of some of the nonprofits that wrote to the FCC in
support of the deal.113  Thus, a direct chain exists through which
AT&T can influence the views or activities of its nonprofits if so
desired.
3. The Comcast-Time Warner Cable Merger
In February 2014, Comcast announced a proposed forty-five bil-
lion dollar merger with Time Warner Cable.114 Comcast applied the
same aggressive lobbying tactics in its recent bid to buy Time
Warner Cable as it did before obtaining FCC approval in 2011 to
buy NBCUniversal.115 Comcast executives conceded that they had
been working to organize a comprehensive push for FCC approval
of the deal, but adamantly rejected any suggestion that the com-
pany gave money to nonprofit groups and charities (particularly
those serving African-Americans, Latinos, and Asians) to buy off
support for their merger deals, saying it was “offensive to the orga-
nizations [they] support”116 and “[w]e have never provided
financial support to an organization in exchange for support in a
transaction.”117 The behavior of nonprofit groups suggests other-
wise. The corporate-sponsored comments that the FCC received
111. Brooks Boliek & Mike Zapler, AT&T Deal Offers Risk, Reward, POLITICO (Apr. 22,
2011), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0411/53580.html; Krigman, supra note 76.
112. McLure, supra note 104.
113. Id.
114. Comcast ultimately aborted its plan to acquire Time Warner Cable in April 2015. See
Shalini Ramachandran, Comcast Kills Time Warner Cable Deal, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/comcast-kills-time-warner-cable-deal-1429878881.
115. See Tony Romm, Comcast Spreads Cash Wide on Capitol Hill, POLITICO (Mar. 9, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/03/comcast-cash-spread-wide-on-capitol-hill-
104469.html; see also Eric Lipton, Comcast Recruits Its Beneficiaries to Lobby for Time Warner Deal,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/06/business/media/comcast-
recruits-its-beneficiaries-to-lobby-for-time-warner-deal.html.
116. Eric Lipton, Comcast’s Web of Lobbying and Philanthropy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/21/business/media/comcasts-web-of-lobbying-and-
philanthropy.html.
117. Lipton, supra note 115.
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echoed Comcast and Time Warner Cable’s defense of the merger
before the Senate Judiciary Committee in April 2014, when Com-
mittee members expressed concern that the merger would raise
cable television and high-speed Internet prices for consumers:
Comcast and Time Warner do not compete anywhere, so merging
would not affect competition.118  This comment was repeatedly sub-
mitted to the FCC over the course of the Commission’s merger
review period, and it has also appeared in different media spaces.
The agency should be concerned about a possible conflict of inter-
est because the outspoken nonprofit organizations have, at best, a
tenuous connection to the telecom deal.
Within a few hours of Comcast’s merger announcement, the U.S.
Hispanic Chamber of Commerce publicly endorsed the deal, call-
ing it a “win-win situation for American businesses.”119 Notably, the
Hispanic Chamber of Commerce collected at least $320,000 from
Comcast from 2004 to 2012, and did not mention that funding in
its public endorsement120 or its comment to the FCC.121 In August
2014, Varsovia Fernandez, the president and chief executive of the
Greater Philadelphia Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, which has
received $95,000 from Comcast over the last three years, filed a
comment with the FCC122 that parroted Comcast’s and Time
Warner Cable’s statements to the aforementioned Senate Judiciary
Committee in April 2014.123  In December 2014, Fernandez wrote
an op-ed in The Philadelphia Daily News arguing that the widespread
public criticism of the merger was neither balanced nor fact-based
and “cheapens what should be an important debate and puts [this
country’s] long-term economic health at risk.”124  Nowhere in the
piece did she mention that Comcast funded her organization.
Readers may well have given Fernandez’s opinion piece greater
118. Edward Wyatt, Senate Panel Expresses Caution on Merger of Cable Giants, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/10/business/media/senate-committee-
begins-its-review-of-comcast-deal.html.
119. U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Com., USHCC Congratulates Comcast on Planned Merger with
Time Warner Cable (Feb. 13, 2014), http://ushcc.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Feb-13-
2014-USHCC-Congratulates-Comcast-on-Planned-Merger-with-Time-Warner-Cable.pdf.
120. Lipton, supra note 116.
121. Letter from Marc Rodriguez, Chairman of the Board, and Javier Palomarez, Presi-
dent & CEO, U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Com., to Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (Aug. 25, 2014),
http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=6018319455.
122. Letter from Varsovia Fernandez, President & CEO, Greater Philadelphia Hispanic
Chamber of Com., to Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (Aug. 23, 2014), http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/
comment/view?id=6018311866; Lipton, supra note 116.
123. Wyatt, supra note 118.
124. Varsovia Fernandez, Comcast Deserves a Fair Shake, PHILA. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 16, 2014),
http://www.philly.com/philly/opinion/20141217_Comcast_deserves_a_fair_shake.html
(last accessed Apr. 11, 2015).
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credit than they would have with knowledge of the financial
relationship.
One might suggest that Fernandez’s op-ed expressed her own
views, independent from the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce in
the article.  Even if the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce would
have taken the same position absent the financial contribution
from Comcast, it would still have been helpful to the FCC to know
that the organization received corporate funds in determining
whether to discount the comment she filed and the opinion piece,
if the FCC decided to take notice of it.  Without this information,
the FCC may have assumed that the organization was a disinter-
ested party when it was not.  At the very least, disclosure would
avoid the appearance of impropriety for nonprofit groups submit-
ting comments to the agency if a financial conflict of interest is later
revealed. Moreover, disclosure may avoid the public’s loss of confi-
dence in the commenting process.
A nonprofit comment that is supported by data and expertise
might appear even more credible and valuable to the FCC.  In April
2015, the New York Times shined the public spotlight on Geoffrey A.
Manne, executive director of the International Center of Law and
Economics, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research center.125  Manne
also helps run an advocacy group called TechFreedom, which a
small group of donors, including Comcast, fund.126  In the year
before it announced the proposed merger, Comcast—through its
trade association the National Cable & Telecommunications Associ-
ation—distributed $25,000 to TechFreedom and $25,000 to the
International Center of Law and Economics designated to Tech-
Freedom.127  On the same day that Comcast announced its
proposed merger, Manne endorsed the merger in a media state-
ment posted on TechFreedom claiming that the merger would not
reduce competition.128  In April 2014, Manne published a scholarly
article arguing that the merger would not be anticompetitive129 and
125. Lipton, supra note 116.
126. Id.
127. See Schedule I to Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax of
National Cable & Telecommunications Association 27, 30 (2013), https://www.document
cloud.org/documents/1710310-ncta-form-990-for-2013-public-inspection-copy.html (last ac-
cessed Apr. 11, 2015).
128. Comcast/Time Warner Merger Won’t Reduce Competition, Actually Expand Net Neutrality,
TECHFREEDOM (Feb. 13, 2014), http://techfreedom.org/post/76540083322/comcast-time-
warner-merger-wont-reduce.
129. Geoffrey A. Manne, Beneficience Is Beside the Point: The Antitrust Realities of the Comcast/
Time Warner Cable Merger, 4 CPI Antitrust Chronicle, no. 1, Apr. 2014, https://
www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/file/view/7154.
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also summarized that paper in an article posted on Turn on the Mar-
ket, a blog for academic commentary.130  In May 2014, he wrote an
article in Wired magazine endorsing the deal and pushing back
against arguments by “merger naysayers.”131  And in August 2014,
Manne filed a six-page comment to the FCC that resembled an aca-
demic paper with detailed analysis in support of the merger.132
At no point did Manne mention that Comcast financially sup-
ported two nonprofit organizations he heads. Wired, however,
included a disclosure indicating, “The author’s work is supported
in part by financial contributions from broadband and content
providers.”133  At the very least, this disclosure has prophylactic
value as it prevents the appearance of corruption.  It also enables
readers to consider the source of funding when evaluating Manne’s
publications and to carefully scrutinize his arguments for any po-
tential bias.  Short of direct evidence of someone changing position
on an issue, it is admittedly difficult to prove the link between
money and influence. But there is ample research in the scientific
community on how money can subconsciously influence someone’s
thoughts and behavior, which can affect his judgment or deci-
sions.134 Even Manne admitted to the New York Times that “maybe
there is some subconscious thing there” when confirming his finan-
cial affiliation with Comcast to the New York Times.135 It is becoming
too familiar of a practice that telecom companies looking to merge
will carefully orchestrate astroturf campaigns, which garner support
130. Geoffrey A. Manne, Why the Antitrust Realities Support the Comcast-Time Warner Cable
Merger, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Apr. 14, 2014), http://truthonthemarket.com/2014/04/14/
why-the-antitrust-realities-support-the-comcast-time-warner-cable-merger/.
131. Geoffrey A. Manne, Actually, the Comcast-Time Warner Merger Doesn’t Hurt Netflix,
WIRED (May 9, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/05/actually-the-comcast-time-warner-
merger-doesnt-hurt-netflix/.
132. Geoffrey A. Manne & Ben Sperry, Comments of International Center for Law &
Economics to Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (Aug. 25, 2014), http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document
/view?id=7521817464.
133. Manne, supra note 129. Wired also included the following disclosure in a separate
article by Manne on the FCC’s net neutrality rulemaking: “ICLE is supported in part by
financial contributions from organizations on both sides of the net neutrality debate.” Geof-
frey A. Manne, Opinion, The FCC’s Net Neutrality Victory is Anything But, WIRED (Mar. 3, 2015),
http://www.wired.com/2015/03/fcc-better-call-saul/.
134. David B. Resnick has written substantially on how conflicts of interests can operate at
a subconscious level and how “[m]oney can affect research by affecting the judgments, deci-
sions, and actions of individual scientists and research organizations, including private
companies, universities, government agencies, or professional societies.” He argues that
“[e]veryone—even people with the highest degree of integrity—can be influenced in subtle
ways by money.” See DAVID B. RESNICK, THE PRICE OF TRUTH: HOW MONEY AFFECTS THE NORMS
OF SCIENCE 77–79 (2007).
135. Lipton, supra note 115.
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for their deals from nonprofit and minority-led groups, to nudge
federal regulators to approve their deals.
III. MOVING FORWARD: FILTERING OUT
CORPORATE-SPONSORED COMMENTS
One of the largest challenges facing the modern administrative
state lies in the sheer volume of public comments it receives, largely
through online filing systems like Regulations.gov, or in the FCC’s
case, an agency’s own Electronic Comment Filing System.136  This
section proposes a financial conflicts of interest disclosure rule to
help the FCC distinguish astroturf comments, funded in part by the
very parties to a proposed merger, from grassroots comments. If
public interest groups also paid commenters to submit comments,
those should also be subject to disclosure.  But since most public
interest groups have less financial resources and less influence over
agencies,137 the reform in this section targets corporate-sponsored
comments.  This financial conflicts of interest disclosure rule would
help agencies judge the credibility of the public comments it re-
ceives.  An agency’s knowledge concerning financial conflicts of
interest increases the value of the comments themselves.  On a
broader scale, this is relevant because this Administration has taken
a strong stance in favor of open government.138 Although the FCC
is an independent agency outside of the executive branch, the FCC
would undermine its own credibility in the eyes of the public to act
contrary to, or not be in favor of, such an overarching policy.
On a narrower scale, this reform is particularly relevant because
the FCC may pay more attention to sophisticated commenters who
submit technical comments than to ordinary commenters who sub-
mit a values-based comments without supporting data or analysis.
The FCC provides the public with suggestions on how to prepare
“effective” comments, and addresses the latter type of unsupported
comments by saying, “[w]hile anyone may comment, our ultimate
decision has to be reasonable pursuant to the Administrative Proce-
dure Act; we have to provide a basis for our decision and show how
136. See generally Alex Howard, FCC Looks to Upgrade IT as Net Neutrality Comments Clog
System, TECHREPUBLIC (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.techrepublic.com/article/fcc-looks-to-up
grade-it-as-net-neutrality-comments-crash-system/.
137. See infra note 52.
138. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, supra note 61
(“My Administration is committed to creating an unprecedented level of openness in Gov-
ernment. We will work together to ensure the public trust and establish a system of
transparency, public participation, and collaboration. Openness will strengthen our democ-
racy and promote efficiency and effectiveness in Government.”).
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our rule will achieve its purpose.”139  While some might argue that
the FCC should not consider unsupported comments at all, even if
they are significant in number,140 I contend that at least when an
agency, like the FCC, is mandated to consider how major transac-
tions affect the public interest, it should give a fair shake to
ordinary comments expressing values preferences.  Such considera-
tion is good for democracy and agency legitimacy. Requiring
disclosure of financial conflicts of interest would be a critical move
for the FCC in determining the representative balance of prefer-
ences, technical or values-based, it receives. By adopting this
reform, the FCC would demonstrate integrity in its decision-making
process. Without integrity public confidence in the notice-and-com-
ment process will dwindle as people will be unsure of whether
agencies actually consider their comments.
A. Reevaluating Congress’s Public Participation “Check” on Agencies
In the telecommunications merger review context, as seen from
the examples in Part II, money dictates an interested party’s power
and influence over agencies. In her book on monopoly power in
the telecom industry, Professor Susan Crawford argues that “in the
absence of opposition [to the Comcast-NBCU merger] from an-
other large corporation, the tens of thousands of comments filed in
support of the public advocates’ views were outweighed by the hun-
dreds of supportive comments from Comcast allies—state and local
officials, business groups, and nonprofits.”141 If large corporations
seeking merger approval are strategically and systematically outma-
neuvering other public advocates in the notice-and-comment
process, the public interest mandate has not ensured that the FCC
hears public voices and carefully considers public concerns in its
merger review.
Although public comments cannot serve as an informal plebi-
scite on an issue before an agency, they can still affect an agency’s
picture of public preferences.142  Astroturfing risks drowning out
other voices within the collective grassroots dialogue, thus giving
the FCC a distorted view of public preferences143 and impeding the
139. Rulemaking Process at the FCC, FED. COMMUN’C COMM’N (last accessed Apr. 13, 2015),
http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/rulemaking-process-fcc.
140. See Farina, supra note 5.
141. CRAWFORD, supra note 44, at 215.
142. Mendelson, supra note 85, at 181.
143. Mendelson, supra note 5, at 1372.
WINTER 2016] Astroturf Campaigns 547
agency’s ability to fulfill its public interest mandate.  If a corpora-
tion uses the public as a microphone to amplify its interest in a
public process such as notice and comment, then agencies should
be prepared to recognize when comments should be taken at face
value, discounted, or ruled out altogether. Knowledge about finan-
cial contributions behind the comments will assist agencies in doing
this.
For example, if a genuine researcher happens to receive a contri-
bution from an interested party in a telecommunications merger
pending FCC review, the FCC should not should not necessarily
rule out her technical data in a comment altogether if it knows
about the contribution. Rather, the agency should flag the com-
ment for closer scrutiny of the accuracy of the data in order to
determine whether and to what degree the comment should be dis-
counted in the agency’s information gathering and analysis. The
lack of disclosure, however, might cause the FCC to too readily ac-
cept the technical materials in those types of comments.  Thus,
astroturf comments could be technically misleading as well. The key
is for the FCC to smoke out whether financial contributions have
influenced the comment and whether it is based on technical data,
a policy position, or a values preference.
If rulemaking is a democratic process, then agencies must be ex-
pected to exercise reasoned decision-making and to justify their
regulatory outcomes.144 The democratic nature of rulemaking nec-
essarily requires agency officials to consider the relevant range of
public views and to be fully informed about conflicting interests
and values in order to deliberatively choose among them.145 If the
FCC cannot distinguish between astroturf and grassroots comments
to a proposed deal, then it is not considering the relevant range of
public views to thoughtfully and accurately evaluate the deal’s pub-
lic interest merits. Astroturfing prevents the proper ventilation of
genuine public views.  Astroturf comments in effect undermine
what Congress intended to be a “well-reasoned agency deliberation
process,”146 and at least with respect to the FCC, make its notice-
and-comment rulemaking process less democratically legitimate.
Many administrative law scholars agree that federal agencies
should redesign public participation systems to improve the quality
of comments.147 A procedural change would make the comments to
144. Farina, supra note 5, at 139.
145. Id.
146. See Mendelson, supra note 85, at 175.
147. Id. at 183; see also Farina, supra note 5, at 126–27.
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the FCC a more representative survey of public preferences regard-
ing a merger, especially given the high costs of opposing the deal.
Currently, the commenting process is not effective at informing the
FCC of public opinion on large telecom mergers because there are
no political advantages for other large corporations to oppose tele-
communications mergers; particularly when the company looking
to merge is already a large conglomerate, i.e. Comcast.148 Other ma-
jor telephone, cable, media, and Silicon Valley companies have
remained largely silent in telecom mergers.149 The media and tele-
communications world has become sufficiently consolidated that
there is little upside to opposing another deal, particularly if these
companies foresaw dealing with the potentially merged entity.150
Despite their efforts in opposing mergers, public interest groups
may fail to persuade the FCC unless the agency has better informa-
tion about conflicts of interest to enable them to distinguish
astroturf from grassroots comments.
B. Financial Conflicts of Interest Disclosure Rule
Transparency through disclosure has long existed in the field of
medicine and science to help assure the integrity of researchers
and research programs that receive government or private funding.
Courts and administrative agencies rely on the accuracy and impar-
tiality of the scientific research before them to inform their
decisions.  In the late 1990s, agencies designed a series of reforms
in the medical research setting to offset pressure on researchers
and scientists from patent royalties and other sources of remunera-
tion.151  The National Institutes of Heath and the National Science
Foundation required disclosure of financial interest in connection
with grant proposals.152 The Food and Drug Administration did the
same for clinical trials of new drugs and devices.153  Peer-reviewed
148. See CRAWFORD, supra note 44, at 205.
149. Id.
150. CRAWFORD, supra note 44, at 215.
151. Sage, supra note 81, at 1807–08 n.399.
152. See Responsibilities of Institutions Regarding Investigator Financial Conflicts of In-
terest, 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.601, 50.604 (1998) (NIH policy mandating conflicts of interest
disclosure); Investigator Financial Disclosure Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,820 (1995) (NSF policy
mandating conflicts of interest disclosure).
153. See Financial Disclosure by Clinical Investigators, 63 Fed. Reg. 5233-01 (1998) (FDA
policy mandating conflicts of interest disclosure).
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medical journals often obliged authors to disclose financial inter-
ests, which would in turn be disclosed to readers.154  The underlying
justification for this disclosure is that physicians acting as scientists
owe fiduciary duties to the public as a whole just as they do as
caregivers to individual patients.155  This intuition still holds true
today, as some members of Congress have advocated for the pub-
lic’s right to know about financial ties between doctors and drug
companies.156
Courts also guard against misleading corporate-funded science
under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which require par-
ties to submit corporate disclosure statements.157  The corporate
disclosure rule provides judges with conflicts of interest informa-
tion to assist them in ascertaining whether recusal is necessary.158
But the rule also enables judges to explicitly discount compromised
research.  In 2008, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court in Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, reviewing a punitive damages award against
Exxon from the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, refused to consider
seriously the scholarly research Exxon used to argue that jury
awards are unpredictable in cases involving large punitive dam-
ages.159  Justice Souter, writing for the majority, stated clearly that
“[b]ecause this research was funded in part by Exxon, we decline to
rely on it.”160  Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Lessig noted that
the Court’s action in Exxon v. Baker might “slow the flow of [corpo-
rate-sponsored research] into the judicial process in the future . . .
154. See Sheldon Krimsky & L.S. Rothenberg, Financial Interest and Disclosure in Scientific
Publications, 280 JAMA 225, 225–26 (1998) (advocating more widespread implementation of
disclosure policies by medical journals); see also S. Van McCrary et al., A National Survey of
Policies on Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1621,
1621 (2000) (suggesting current disclosure standards for conflicts of interest disclosure at
medical schools, research institutions, and scientific journals may not be adequate to main-
tain a high level of scientific integrity).
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Sen. Chuck Grassley, Grassley, Kohl Says Public
Should Know When Pharmaceutical Makers Give Money to Doctors (Sept. 6, 2007) (“[t]here
is no question that the drug and device industries have an intricate network of financial ties
with practicing physicians . . . [t]his practice, and the lack of transparency around it, can
obscure the most important question that exists between doctor and patient: what is best for
the patient?”), http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-kohl-say-public-
should-know-when-pharmaceutical-makers-give-money.
157. FED. R. APP. P. 26.1.
158. FED. R. APP. P. 26.1, Committee Notes on Rules (as added Apr. 24, 1998, eff. Dec. 1,
1998; Apr. 29, 2002, eff. Dec. 1, 2002.).
159. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 544 U.S. 471, 501 (2008).
160. Id. at 501 n.17 (refusing to rely on corporate-sponsored academic scholarship).
550 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 49:2
mak[ing] it less likely that the Court would be misled by compro-
mised science.”161
Unlike courts, federal agencies frequently rely upon research
“funded in part by” an interested party,162 so they should at least
have the financial conflicts of interest information to decide how
much weight to place on such research.  In the modern administra-
tive state, there is no rule equivalent to the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure’s corporate disclosure rule.  But there should
be for the very reasons Lessig described in the judicial context.  If
administrative agencies include financial conflicts of interest disclo-
sure rules whenever they seek public comment, they may well “slow
the flow”163 of corporate-sponsored comments into the administra-
tive decision-making process in the future, making it less likely that
agencies would be misled by compromised values, preferences or
technical analysis.
Traces of a disclosure rule in the modern administrative state can
be found, albeit on an isolated occasion, in relation to the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), an agency that
mostly “relies on academic and federally funded research studies
when conducting risk assessment and determining whether to regu-
late exposure to a substance.”164  In September 2013, OSHA
extended the financial conflicts of interest disclosure practice,
which  the NIH, NSF, and FDA already used in other contexts, to an
informal rulemaking.165  Part of this small step towards greater
transparency indicates the influence of OSHA chief David
Michaels, an epidemiologist well-versed in the dangers of conflicted
science and aware of the tobacco industry’s strategy to use science
to obscure the basis for the causal link between smoking and
cancer.166
With this background knowledge, OSHA has requested financial
conflicts of interest disclosure from anyone submitting scientific or
161. Lawrence Lessig, The Republican Street Fight Over Transparency in Government, DAILY




164. MARC ALLEN EISNER, REGULATORY POLITICS IN TRANSITION 156 (2d ed. 2000).
165. Occupational Exposure to Respirable Crystalline Silica, 78 Fed. Reg. 56, 274 (pro-
posed Sept. 12, 2013) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, and 1926), http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-09-12/pdf/2013-20997.pdf.
166. Lessig, supra note 161.   In 2008, Michaels published a book called “Doubt is Their
Product,” that exposed that the tobacco industry abused research to created scientific uncer-
tainty on the hazards of smoking. See generally DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT:
HOW INDUSTRY’S ASSAULT ON SCIENCE THREATENS YOUR HEALTH (2008).  Such duplicitous tac-
tics influenced policy decisions on tobacco to the advantage of industry players. See, e.g., id.,
at xii (“At its heart, this book documents the way in which product defense consultants have
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technical comments, as well as comments or testimony on OSHA’s
scientific and technical analyses for its proposed rulemaking on oc-
cupational exposure to silica.167  For the former group of
commenters, OSHA has sought information on the:
(1) [i]dentification of the funding source(s) and sponsoring
organization(s) of the research; (2) the extent to which the
research findings were reviewed by a potentially affected party
prior to publication or submission to the [public] docket, and
identification of any such parties; and (3) the nature of any
financial relations (e.g., consulting, agreements, expert wit-
ness support, or research funding) between investigators who
conducted the research and any organizations(s) or entities
having an interest in the rulemaking.168
For the latter group, OSHA has sought information on “(1) [t]he
nature of any financial relationships you may have with any organi-
zation(s) or entities having an interest in the rulemaking; and (2)
the extent to which your comments or testimony were reviewed by
an interested party prior to its submission.”169
Notably, OSHA merely requested, but did not require anyone to dis-
close any financial conflicts of interest.  Lessig called this move
“pretty weak tea” compared to the Supreme Court’s disclosure rule;
but, OSHA’s disclosure policy was still a move in the right direction,
as it gave policymakers and the public information about possible
financial pressures that might skew scientific research.170  OSHA
emphasized that it would still consider all of the materials submit-
ted in developing its final rule and supporting analysis, but the
agency sought financial conflicts of interest information “to pro-
mote transparency and scientific integrity of data and technical
information submitted to the [public] record.”171 The agency con-
sidered its aim to be “consistent with Executive Order 13563, issued
on January 18, 2011, which instructs agencies to ensure the objectiv-
ity of any scientific and technological information used to support
shaped and skewed the scientific literature, manufactured and magnified scientific uncer-
tainty, and influenced policy decisions to the advantage of polluters and the manufacturers
of dangerous products.”).
167. Occupational Exposure to Respirable Crystalline Silica, 78 Fed. Reg. at 56,274 (revis-




170. Lessig, supra note 161.
171. Occupational Exposure to Respirable Crystalline Silica, 78 Fed. Reg. 56,274.
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their regulatory actions.”172  The FCC’s regulatory actions in merger
review rely on technological information, so if the Commission re-
quired commenters submitting technological comments to disclose
any financial conflicts of interest, it would be consistent with Execu-
tive Order 13563.  But if an agency plans to take all public
comments at face value, it should require all commenters, not just
those submitting technical comments based on scientific data, to
include a statement of financial conflicts of interest.
In the agency rulemaking context, what little discussion that ex-
ists on the need for a financial conflicts of interest disclosure rule
focuses on comments presenting scientific analysis.173 Lessig’s pro-
posal that an executive order should mandate all agencies to
require commenters to submit financial conflicts of interest disclo-
sures is limited to scientific analysis.174  An executive order could
mandate disclosure of financial conflicts for all commenters, re-
gardless of the substance of their comments, so long as the
President issues it to executive agencies and political gridlock does
not block its passage.  In response to the OSHA silica rulemaking
disclosure requirement, sixteen Republican senators, led by Sena-
tor Lamar Alexander (R-TN), expressed to OSHA their concern
that the rule would chill commenters who think OSHA would pre-
judge the substance of their comments after learning of their
financial backers.175  If a specific issue like silica could garner six-
teen members of Congress to oppose a financial disclosure rule, it
is likely that an executive order attempting to apply the rule across
all administrative agencies would incite louder protest from mem-
bers of Congress.  The fact that the senators’ letter raised the same
172. Id.; Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011); see also notes 53–54.
173. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 161 (“It takes a willed obliviousness not to recognize just
how harmful interested-science has been across the history of federal regulation—not always,
but sometimes.”) (emphasis added). There has been recent mention that a rule may be help-
ful, but no further elaboration beyond a mere acknowledgment. Halpern, supra note 60, at
10682 (stating that “[disclosure], which allows rule makers to ensure they have a balance of
research to consider, should become the norm and be extended throughout the
government”).
174. See Lessig, supra note 161 (concluding that the President should require by executive
order, “every agency accepting submissions presenting scientific analysis require the authors to
include a statement of financial conflicts of interest”) (emphasis added).
175. See Letter from Senators to David Michaels, Assistant Sec’y of Labor, OSHA (Nov. 21,
2013) (“[d]isclosing the funding sources of commenters who submit scientific or technical
substance of those comments and could result in dissuading stakeholders from even submit-
ting comments”), http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/2013_1121_OSHA_silica
_letter_FINAL.pdf; see also Daniel Cressey, Tougher Regulations on Deadly Silica Dust Trigger
Backlash, NATURE (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/tougher-regula-
tions-on-deadly-silica-dust-trigger-backlash/ (quoting Liz Wolgemuth, a spokeswoman for
Sen. Alexander: “[t]he chilling effect the financial disclosure could have seems counter to
the idea of robust inclusion of a diverse set of ideas and views to inform the rule-making”).
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concerns as groups opposing the silica rulemaking, from which the
sixteen senators received $151,266 in the 120 days before they
wrote the letter, creates an appearance of impropriety.176  Rather
than wait for an executive order, executive agencies would do well
to require by binding rule a statement of financial conflicts of inter-
est.  Independent agencies, like the FCC, should do the same.  The
FCC, for its part, could require a disclosure rule pursuant to its
broad authority to review mergers under the Communications Act.
It is even more telling that the chilling effect to which the sena-
tors refer as a negative consequence is precisely what those in favor
of transparency and public engagement have found admirable
about Justice Souter’s footnote in Exxon v. Baker. Namely, trans-
parency deters third parties funded in part by interested parties
from submitting astroturf comments to agencies and helps ensure
that the decision maker is less likely to be misled by compromised
information.  In OSHA’s silica rulemaking, the chilling effect argu-
ment does not apply as forcefully as it would if OSHA required
disclosure, because when disclosure is not mandatory, commenters
whose work is funded in part by interested parties would not be
dissuaded from filing comments despite their conflicts of interest.
In terms of misleading information, there is no difference between
the FCC’s consideration of corporate-funded comments that ex-
press compromised preferences and OSHA’s consideration of
corporate-funded comments that express compromised research.
Both agencies are just as likely to be misled by such comments in
the absence of a disclosure rule. And as Crawford documented,
hundreds of supportive comments from Comcast allies mattered
more to the FCC than tens of thousands of comments submitted by
public advocates during the comment period for the Comcast-
NBCU merger.177
Some might respond that ordinary individuals should not have
the same aforementioned duty of care as physicians and scientists
owe to the public.  Yet, at least in the FCC context, the Commission
does not need to rely on a duty of care to justify requiring disclo-
sure. Rather, the FCC could determine that the disclosure is
necessary to achieve its public interest mandate.  The same lack of
transparency that concerned the Supreme Court in Exxon v. Baker
and OSHA in its 2013 silica rulemaking, should also concern the
FCC in merger review.  Data, analysis, and values preferences from
176. Jay Costa, Senators Criticizing Conflict of Interest Disclosure Surrounding OSHA Ruling Re-
ceive Timely Contributions from Rule’s Opponents, MAPLIGHT (Mar. 24, 2014), http://
maplight.org/content/73438.
177. See supra note 141.
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commenters whose work has been funded in part by the very indus-
try players whose conduct the agency is scrutinizing should be
considered with a grain of salt—or in the Court’s view, should not
be considered at all lest government actors be misled.  Yet, since
OSHA’s 2013 silica rulemaking, no other agency has sought such
financial conflicts of interest disclosure.
C. Building Norms in the Administrative State, the Media & the Public
One possible criticism to agencies requiring a statement of finan-
cial conflicts of interest from anyone submitting a comment is that
it is difficult to enforce because it relies on commenters to self-re-
port and it would be too costly to dedicate agency resources to
double check every submission for failure to disclose.  Yet agencies
can develop new norms.  A biologist, for example, likely knows that
medical and scientific journals oftentimes require conflict of inter-
est disclosure information.  And an advocate before the Supreme
Court knows that the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure require
conflict of interest disclosure information.  Likewise, the public can
come to expect agencies to require conflict of interest disclosure
information as the ordinary course of business in agency decision-
making that includes public participation. General counsel’s offices
of corporations and nonprofit organizations will prompt these enti-
ties to comply with agency rules.
If the norm is to submit a statement disclosing conflicts of inter-
est along with a comment to an agency, then omissions will be the
exception, and the agency could publicize that they will not con-
sider comments that lack disclosure statements.  It is a federal crime
for a person to knowingly and willfully make false or fraudulent
statements, or conceal information regarding any matter within the
jurisdiction of the federal government, even by mere denial.178
This should deter commenters from failing to comply with the dis-
closure rule. Finally, public opinion can also deter commenters
from failing to disclose their financial conflicts of interest. The me-
dia can serve a crucial function as watchdogs that sniff out astroturf,
thereby shaping public opinion about individuals and organizations
who present themselves as independent and objective sources
before an agency, but who actually receive funding from the very
industry players they endorse.
For example, in 2013, Mother Jones broke a story revealing the
financial backers of the American Council of Science and Health
178. 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
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(ACSH),179 a nonprofit advocacy organization that proclaims to
“protect[ ] consumer freedom from a variety of unscientifically
based activist organizations—such as the Natural Resources De-
fense Council, the Center for Science in the Public Interest, and
the Environmental Working Group—that use ‘junk science’ and hy-
perbole about risk to promote fears about our food,
pharmaceuticals and chemicals, and other environmental and lifes-
tyle factors.”180  ACSH has often taken industry-friendly positions on
public health issues, including publicly defending fracking, oppos-
ing mandatory nutrition labeling requirements and New York City’s
attempted ban on big sodas, and dismissing concerns about the po-
tential harms of BPA and pesticides.181  The nonprofit did not
disclose its backers because it found “the sources of [its] support
are irrelevant to [its] scientific investigations.”182  But a leaked inter-
nal financial report from 2013 indicates that ACSH financially
depends heavily on parties that have a large stake in the very public
health debates it shapes.183
Similarly, in the telecommunications industry, the Center for
Public Integrity,184 the New York Times,185 Politico,186 the Wall Street
Journal,187 and the Washington Post,188 have all reported on AT&T’s
and Comcast’s financial backing of nonprofit groups that support
their brand and their proposed mergers.  Public focus on an issue
places pressure on industry regulators like the FCC to take care in
their decision-making process: regulators know the public will pay
close attention to the outcome they reach.  In this sense, the public
relies heavily on the media for its investigative reporting.  Public
179. Andy Kroll & Jeremy Schulman, Leaked Documents Reveal the Secret Finances of Pro-In-
dustry Science Group, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/
2013/10/american-council-science-health-leaked-documents-fundraising.
180. ABOUT THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND HEALTH, http://acsh.org/about-acsh
(last visited Nov. 7, 2015).
181. Kroll & Schulman, supra note 179.
182. Id. (quoting ACSH’s executive director Dr. Gilbert Ross).
183. American Council on Science and Health FY 2013 Financial Update, MOTHER JONES
(2013), http://www.motherjones.com/documents/809483-acsh-financial-summary.
184. McLure, supra note 104.
185. See Lipton, supra note 115; Lipton, supra note 116.
186. Krigman, supra note 76; Boliek & Zapler, supra note 111.
187. Amy Schatz, Comcast Restores Nonprofit’s Funding After Tweet Dust-Up, WALL ST. J.:
WASHINGTON WIRE (May 19, 2011, 1:39 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/05/19/
comcast-restores-nonprofits-funding-after-tweet-dust-up/ (reporting on an incident where
Comcast Vice President of Communications Steve Kipp wrote an email to a nonprofit threat-
ening to pull its funding after the nonprofit posted a negative tweet about Comcast with
reference to the company’s NBC merger).
188. See Cecilia Kang, AT&T Ramps Up Lobby For Proposed T-Mobile Merger, WASH. POST
(May 31, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/atandt-ramps-up-
lobby-for-proposed-t-mobile-merger/2011/05/31/AGYcGmFH_story.html.
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hostility towards certain nonprofit advocacy groups like ACSH or
industry players with a heavy invisible hand in influencing public
debate colors the reputations of such groups and players, and chips
away at the integrity of their brand.  Disclosure requirements might
facilitate the media in its investigative reporting on hidden money
influencing public policy.  If the media consistently uncovers these
types of stories, then such transparency might serve to make corpo-
rate-sponsored comments less misleading, and in turn make it less
common for industry players to call upon nonprofit groups to advo-
cate on their behalf.
CONCLUSION
This paper aims to resolve a small issue—how the FCC should
deal with corporate-sponsored comments, or astroturf, when it
seeks grassroots comments—in a larger problem, which is how
agencies should deal with the significant amount of comments that
they receive for high-profile rulemakings or transactions requiring
approval.  But the solution I propose in this Note has a far-reaching
application.  Every administrative agency should care about the in-
tegrity of the comments it receives and in turn relies on to make its
decisions on regulatory policies.  Thus, the benefits to flagging as-
troturf comments that appear to be independent and objective are
not limited to the FCC.
